A Comparison of inequality measurement techniques A by Rohde, Nicholas C.
A Comparison of Inequality Measurement Techniques 
 
Nicholas Rohde 
School of Economics 
The University of Queensland 
Brisbane, Australia 
 
August 2008 
 
 
There are numerous statistical techniques designed for the measurement of inequality. 
Each individual index has a unique set of properties which can make the choice of an 
appropriate measure difficult. This paper reviews the desirable properties for inequality 
indices to exhibit and proposes an additional characteristic that an effective measure may 
satisfy.  Existing inequality measures are assessed against these criteria and a new 
technique that satisfies all desirable properties is proposed. An empirical demonstration 
of the proposed measure is provided. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The literature on inequality measurement gives an extensive range of indices that may be 
used to analyze the distribution of an economic resource such as income. The 
development of an axiomatic framework helps to restrict this eclectic range of measures 
to a more manageable group by ruling out techniques that fail to meet certain useful 
criteria. The fundamental axioms of symmetry and scalar invariance (see Fields and Fei, 
1978) require an inequality measure be naïve to permutations of incomes (symmetry) and 
invariant to scalar transformations (scalar invariance).  Dalton’s principle of population 
(Dalton, 1920) rules out any index that is affected by a proportional replication of the 
underlying population, while the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (see Pigou (1912), 
Dalton (1920) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973)) requires that a measure respond 
appropriately to any redistribution of income from one individual to another.  These 
axioms alone still allow for a wide variety of possible inequality indices. However the 
introduction of the diminishing transfer property (Kolm, 1976) and decomposition 
principle from Theil (1967), Cowell (1977), (Cowell and Kuga, 1981a,b) Foster (1983) 
Shorrocks (1980) and Bourguignon (1979) has reduced the range of viable indices to a 
subset of the Generalized Entropy (GE) class of measures.   
 
Despite this thorough axiomatic structure, certain ad hoc measures which satisfy only 
basic requirements such as the Gini coefficient, Relative Mean Deviation and Coefficient 
of Variation remain extremely popular for empirical studies, as well as the sophisticated 
classes of social welfare based measures proposed by Dalton (1920) Aigner and Heins 
(1967) and Atkinson (1970) (now referred to as the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen or A-K-S class 
of measure).   
 
For the social welfare classes of measure the reason for their popularity is fairly clear;  
the indices neatly summarize either the potential social welfare wasted due to inequality 
or the reduction in incomes we could tolerate for an equivalent welfare should we decide 
to distribute incomes equally.  An additional advantage of these approaches is that they 
allow the user to explicitly model his or her attitudes to inequality amongst the lower and 
higher ends of the distribution.   
 
The reasons for the popularity of the more ad hoc measures (Gini coefficient, 
Logarithmic Variance, Relative Mean Deviation, Coefficient of Variation and others) are 
not so clear.  While sharing the advantage of predating other more coherent classes of 
measure1, it seems unlikely that these techniques will ever be completely abandoned in 
favor of the more axiomatic Generalized Entropy measures.  In this paper we review 
some of the properties of these types of inequality measures and investigate some of 
mechanics behind them. We are specifically interested in taking inequality measures of 
the form ∑
=
=
n
i
ixfn
I
1
)(1  (where ix  is the income accruing to the ith individual and I  is 
the inequality measure) and examining the properties of the evaluation function )( ixf .  
We suggest that the evaluation functions of certain ad hoc measures are easily 
reconcilable with basic notions of inequality and that this property has a certain merit.  
We propose an inequality measure that exhibits this property for the evaluation function 
and also satisfies the given axioms of measurement.  The new measure is demonstrated 
with an empirical example using income data from Taiwan. 
 
 
2. Axioms of inequality measurement 
 
Consider the set of distributions }0{ nnn xxD ≥∧ℜ∈=  where x  is income or some 
other economic variable of interest. Let ( )nxxxI ..., 21  be the inequality measure. The 
axioms of measurement are given below. 
 
(1) Symmetry 
 
A symmetric measure considers only the incomes of the individuals being measured such 
that any rearrangements of incomes amongst individuals will leave the measure 
unchanged. Take the distribution Dx∈ .  Inequality measure I  is symmetric if ( ) ( )xPIxI =  where P  is any nn ×  permutation matrix2.  This is analogous to stating 
( ) ( )nn xxxIxxxI ,..,..., 1221 =  for any possible regrouping of x .   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The Gini coefficient first appeared in 1912, while other measures such as the Relative Mean Deviation 
have been used considerably longer. 
2 A matrix which may be constructed from any permutation of the rows and columns of an nn ×  identity 
matrix. 
(2) Scale independence  
 
A measure should be insensitive to proportional changes in the underlying variable 
including changes in the units of measurement.  The inequality measure I  satisfies the 
relativity or scale independence axiom if ( ) ( )GxIxI =  +ℜ∈∀G . 
 
(3) Population Replication 
 
The inequality measure should be invariant to proportional changes in the underlying 
population.  Consider distribution 'x  which is a proportional replicate of distribution x  
where each element occurs with frequency f  i.e. },...,...,,...{' 12,21111 nfnff xxxxxxx = .  I  
will satisfy the principle of population replication if ( ) ( )xIfxI =;  +Ν∈∀f . 
 
(4) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle 
 
The Pigou-Dalton transfer principle requires that any transfer of income from a higher to 
a lower income earner must reduce the inequality measure.  The definition given here is 
taken from Cowell and Kuga (1981). )(xI  will satisfy the transfer principle if  ( ) 0<xT ji  
for ji xx <  where it exists and ( ) ( ) ( )ε
εε
ε
},...,,...,{
lim 2121
0
−−+≡ →
ji
ji
xxxIxxxI
xT . 
 
(5) Decomposability 
 
Consider a partition of x  into s subgroups such that each subgroup kx  has 1≥kn  
elements, ∅=tk xx I  for tk xx ≠  and ∑
=
=
s
i
i nn
1
.  The inequality index I  is 
decomposable if it may be written as a function of the within group and between group 
inequalities. ( )sss nnnIIIfI ,...,,,...,,,..., 212121 μμμ= where kμ  is the mean income 
level of partition kx  and kI is the inequality measured within kx . 
 
(6) Principle of diminishing transfers 
 
The principle of diminishing transfers requires that a progressive transfer (from a higher 
to a lower income earner) should have a diminishing effect at higher income levels.  The 
example given by Kolm (1976) says a small transfer from an individual with an income 
of 900 units to an individual with 500 should reduce inequality less than an equivalent 
transfer from the individual with the income of 500 units to another earning 100 units. 
Using the definition of the transfer principle from (3) the diminishing transfer principle 
may be formally stated as ( ) ( )xTxT lkji <  where lkij xxxx −=−  and ki xx < . 
 
 
 
 
3. The mechanics of some inequality measures 
 
Consider an inequality measure of the form ∑
=
=
n
i
ixfn
I
1
)(1  with mean income levelμ . 
Our objective here is to investigate the manner in which f  could assign individual 
components to each income ix .  One method for assignment used by most ad hoc 
measures is for ( )ixf  to reflect the ‘extremeness’ of income ix  relative to the mean of the 
distribution.  These measures typically assign positive components to all μ≠ix , with the 
assigned values increasing monotonically as ix  diverges from μ .  The inequality 
measure may then be calculated as the expected value of these components. An 
advantage of this property is that we can divide the population into any arbitrary 
subgroups and observe the extent to which total inequality is driven by the incomes 
within each subgroup, while the original measure may be reconstructed as the population 
weighted average of these group contributions. Thus the inequality measure may be 
written as 
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 and gives an indication of the ‘extremeness’ of the incomes 
within subgroup kx . In this paper we suggest the ability for an inequality measure to be 
dissected in this manner such that we can observe the proportion of total inequality that 
may be attributed to any individual income or group has some appeal.   
 
Three simple measures that exemplify this notion are the Relative Mean Deviation, the 
Logarithmic Variance and the Variance of the Logarithms.  These are 
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where Lμ is the mean of the logarithm of income. 
 
Each measure assigns a value of zero to mean incomes and increasingly positive 
components as incomes diverge from a point of central reference3.  This characteristic 
can be defined with the conditions 
 ( ) 0≥ixf  for all ix , ( ) 0' <ixf for μ<ix  and ( ) 0' >ixf for μ<ix  
 
where μ  is the point of central reference.  For the Variance of Logarithms measure this 
reference point is Lμ . 
 
These properties alone however are not sufficient to ensure that the transfer principle 
(axiom 4) is satisfied.  To ensure this we need to add the requirement4 ( ) 0'' >ixf  for all 
ix , a condition not satisfied by these three measures. The Relative Mean Deviation fails 
the transfer principle as it is insensitive to transfers that do not cross the mean while VL  
and LV  can record an increase in inequality from progressive transfers at high income 
levels.  As these measures fail to satisfy this crucial axiom they remain as peripheral 
techniques for the measurement of inequality. 
 
The square of the Coefficient of Variation5 is a more effective index as it satisfies the 
transfer principle and is another measure that exhibits this property for f.   The measure 
may be calculated as 
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It is simple to verify that )( ixf  increases as ix  diverges from μ , that these assigned 
components are non negative, and that ( ) 0'' >ixf  for all ix .  As this measure is a special 
case of the Generalized Entropy family, it may be additively decomposed into between 
and within group inequalities (axiom 5).  However this measure places an equal 
weighting on equivalent transfers regardless of the positioning in the distribution of the 
incomes concerned.  For this reason the measure fails the diminishing transfer principle 
(axiom 6), leading to criticism of this measure from Atkinson (1970) and Love and 
Wolfson (1976) who suggest that this characteristic alone may be enough to disqualify 
the (square root of this) measure from consideration.   
 
The Gini coefficient possess a similar property in assigning individual components based 
on the extremeness of that income, but with respect to all other incomes rather than just 
the mean income level.  This measure may be calculated as 
 
                                                 
3 In the case of the VL this is the mean of the logarithm of income. 
4 See section 4 for more detail on this property. 
5 It is not possible to extract the individual elements of the Coefficient of Variation, however to do so for 
the square of this measure is straightforward. 
(6)     ∑∑
=
=
−
=
n
i
n
j
ji
n
xx
n
G
1
1
2
1
μ  
where ∑
=
−n
j
ji
n
xx
1 2 μ   is a non negative measure of the relative distance of ix  from the other 
incomes.    As such we can still use the Gini coefficient to examine the extent that a 
particular income drives inequality by looking at each individual component, although 
there is no clear-cut point of central reference.   Despite this property, the Gini coefficient 
is unable to be exhaustively decomposed into between and within subgroup inequalities 
(see Pyatt, 1976) and any attempt to do so leaves an awkward residual component (axiom 
5).  The measure also fails to satisfy the diminishing transfer principle (axiom 6) as the 
weighting of a transfer depends only the rankings of incomes involved (Cowell, 1977). 
 
 
It is difficult to apply the same concept to the social welfare based A-K-S class of 
measures as they are not easily written in the form ∑
=
=
n
i
ixfn
I
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)(1  such that the 
individual elements may be analyzed.  Dalton’s measure however may be written as 
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where ( )ixW  is the welfare of individual i  and is a concave and symmetric  function of 
income.  For these measures ( )ixf  is simply a measure of the relative welfare of 
individual i , normalized such that lower income earners have negative relative welfare 
and higher positive income earners have positive relative welfare.  Thus the expected 
value of ( )ixf  for some arbitrary subgroup of x gives an indication of the relative 
welfare of the subgroup rather than the extremeness of the incomes concerned.  A 
subgroup may have a mean relative welfare of zero, which could be due to all the 
included incomes being equal to μ , or just as easily, be the result of some very high 
incomes being offset by the inclusion of very low incomes.  Hence the average inequality 
component of group k, ( )∑
=
=
k
i
k
ik
k
c xfn
I
1
1  carries some information about the total 
magnitude of incomes in subgroup kx  (a negative value implies low welfare which 
implies low incomes), but contains no information about how far these incomes deviate 
from μ .  Conversely the ‘extremeness’ property for ( )ixf  ensures that kcI  carries 
information about the extent to which the constitute incomes differ from μ  (or other 
measure of central tendency) but not as to the manner in which they deviate i.e. by being 
higher or lower than the mean. 
 
The social welfare based measures satisfy axioms 1-4 and 6 from above but are unable to 
be additively decomposed.  They do however possess a weaker ‘aggregative’ property as 
described by Bourguignon (1979). 
 
It is more difficult to place an interpretation on the individual components that make up 
the Generalized Entropy class of measure.  These are typically given as 
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where the parameter α  dictates the sensitivity of the measure at higher and lower ends of 
the distribution.  A problem arises due to the existence of several different methods for 
the calculation of various GE measures, each of which assigns different values to 
individual incomes for the same index.  Calculated as is, the GE index assigns positive 
components to high incomes and negative components to low incomes for positive values 
for α .  These are reversed when α  changes sign, making it difficult to assign a direct 
economic interpretation upon the individual components. While these measures have a 
solid grounding in information theory, the normalization implicit in equation (8) dilutes 
any interpretation that may be placed on the individual components.  Cowell (1977) 
derives this class of measure from first principles, which is useful for determining an 
interpretation for ( )ixf . The measures may be written as 
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where the function h  assigns information content to the proportional share of income ix   
and is usually assumed to be of the form  
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The parameter β  determines the shape of the information theoretic function h  and is 
used to control the emphasis placed on higher or lower incomes, while ( )nN ,β  is used to 
normalize the measure chosen such that GEII = . The advantage of equation (9) is that 
each )( ixf  is proportional to the difference between the information content of each 
income and the information content of an income corresponding to perfect equality (i.e. 
μ=ix ).  As these individual elements may take negative or positive values depending on 
the size and sign of the individual incomes, the average of elements in any subgroup will 
have a similar property to that of a social welfare based measure.   
 
 
4. Determining a new measure 
 
Given that none of the established measures satisfy both the extremeness property for ( )ixf  and the given axioms, we propose a new measure here for this purpose.  Consider 
the index 
 
(11)     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= ∑
= μμ
μ in
i
i xx
n
I
1
ln1  
In continuous form 
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With grouped data  
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where ks  is the income share of kx , and kp  is the population share. 
 
The given index is equal to the sum of Theil’s T and L inequality measures, special cases 
of the GE class of measure as 1,0→α  respectively.  It is straightforward to verify that 
( ) 0≥ixf  for ni ...1= , ( ) 0' <ixf for μ<ix  and ( ) 0' >ixf for μ<ix  and thus exhibits 
the desired properties for )( ixf .  The measure is shown to satisfy axioms 1-6 below. 
 
Axiom (1) Symmetry:  The measure is symmetric as )()( ji xfxf =  ∀  ji xx =  
 
Axiom (2) Scale independence: The measure is insensitive to income scaling factor G  
since                                                       
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Axiom (3) Population invariance: Consider a replication of underlying distribution x 
where each ix  occurs with frequency +∈Nf .  The inequality measure is 
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Axiom (4) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle:  The transfer principle will be satisfied if ( ) 0'' >ixf  ni ...1= .  To see this, consider a progressive transfer of size dx  from higher 
income earner j to lower income earner i.   The effect of the transfer on the inequality 
index I with evaluation function )(xf  is 
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The evaluation function )(xf  and first and second derivatives are: 
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Axiom (5) Decomposability: Various proofs and demonstrations of the decomposition of 
Theil’s T and L measures are given by Theil (1967), Cowell and Kuga (1980), Foster 
(1983), Shorrocks (1980) and Bourguignon (1979) and are not reproduced here.  The 
decomposition of the proposed index requires that the measure of inequality within 
subgroup k can be written as kkk LTI +=  where kT  and kL  are Theil’s inequality 
indices.  That is, we must be able to separate each within group inequality estimate 
kI into contributions kT  and kL  as each receives a different weighting for the 
decomposition of the index.  Then the index may be decomposed as 
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where BT and BL  are the between group inequality indices. It should be noted that this 
decomposition is somewhat messier than the standard GE decomposition due to the 
required separation of T and L and a more complex weighting system required to 
reconstruct the original measure. This messiness may be seen as a disadvantage of this 
technique.  
 
Axiom (6) Diminishing Transfers:  I  will satisfy the diminishing transfer principle if ( ) ( )xTxT lkji <  where lkij xxxx −=−  and ki xx < .  We can write  
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which will be positive if  0)(3
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thus the measure satisfies the diminishing transfer axiom. 
 
 
5. An empirical example 
 
In this section a brief example of the proposed measure is given.  The data analyzed is 
decile data for Taiwan from 1993 and is taken from a study by Chotikapanich, Griffiths 
and Rao (2007).  The decile shares refer to the proportion of total income accruing to 
income-ordered population groups of size 10%, while the individual components are 
given by )(1 in xf . The aggregates of these are presented in the bottom row in bold type. 
 
Table 1. Decile shares and inequality components for Taiwan 1993.  
 
Decile share ( )in xf1  
0.037 0.062637893 
0.051 0.032993883 
0.061 0.019277557 
0.070 0.010700248 
0.079 0.004950169 
0.089 0.001281872 
0.103 8.86764E-05 
0.12 0.003646431 
0.148 0.018818020 
0.242 0.125494991 
1   0.279889741 
 
As the given measure exhibits the discussed ‘extremeness’ property, each individual 
component )(1 in xf  reflects the extent to which the income of each decile share differs 
from the mean income level. Using this concept we may take each individual component 
to determine the amount of total inequality attributable to each decile share.  As expected, 
the highest and lowest decile shares give the largest contributions to total inequality as 
these shares represent the most extreme incomes. According to the measure, slightly over 
44% (0.125494991/0.279889741) of all the measured inequality comes from the highest 
10% of incomes, while the lowest earning 10% contributes over 22% of total inequality. 
We also see that the decile shares with more moderate incomes (where income shares 
become roughly proportional to population shares) contribute diminishing amounts to 
total inequality. This dissection of the measure says nothing about the inequality within 
the subgroups however, only on the inequality between the subgroups and how much of 
the between group inequality is driven by each decile share.  If information on the 
distribution within each subgroup is available however, this information may be included 
in the analysis using decomposition equation (20).  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The paper establishes the properties and demonstrates the empirical viability of a new 
inequality measure.  The measure works by assigning positive values to each income or 
income share based on the extent to which they deviate from a point of central reference, 
the average of which may be used as an inequality summary statistic. Of the many 
inequality indices that have this characteristic, the proposed measure is the only one that 
also satisfies the axioms of decomposability and diminishing transfers.  An empirical 
application to Taiwanese data showcases a desirable aspect of this property.  
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